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Abstract
Fifteen months after Texas International Airlines surprised the
commercial aviation community by announcing it had purchased 9.2
percent of the common stock of National Airlines,’ the Civil Aeronautics
Board [C.A.B.] unanimously approved not only Texas International’s
merger application, but also the subsequently-filed Pan American
World Airways-National Airlines merger application
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Introduction
Fifteen months after Texas International Airlines surprised the
commercial aviation community by announcing it had purchased 9.2
percent of the common stock of National Airlines,' the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board [C.A.B.] unanimously approved not only Texas Interna-
tional's merger application, but also the subsequently-filed Pan Ameri-
can World Airways-National Airlines merger application.2 Before the
C.A.B. decision, Texas International agreed to sell its 2.9 million
shares of National Airlines stock to Pan American for a pre-tax profit
of $45,780,000.1 On January 7, 1980, the merger became effective,4
giving Pan American the domestic route system it had sought for 34
* Attorney with the firm of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson, West Palm
Beach, Florida. B.A. 1969 Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1972 Vanderbilt University;
M.A.L.S. 1977 University of Michigan, LL.M. Candidate, Institute of Air & Space
Law, McGill University. Member Indiana, Florida and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Wall St. J., July 11, 1978, at 2, col. 2.
2. Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of
Control of, and Merger with National, Docket Nos. 33112, 33283, CAB Order Nos.
79-12-163, 79-12-164, 79-12-165 (October 24, 1979).
3. Palm Beach Post Times, July 29, 1979, § A, at 24, col. 1. As of October 19,
1979, Texas International had sold Pan American 38% of its holdings in National for
after-tax profits of $19.3 million. Pan Am had further paid Texas International three
million dollars for an option to purchase the remaining 1.3 million shares at $50 per
share. Texas International eventually sold Pan Am all of its National stock and real-
ized the expected profit. See A Plucky Challenge to Eastern's Shuttle, Bus. WK., Sept.
22, 1980, at 71; A New Air War, TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 72.
4. Application of Pan American World Airways, Inc. for Acquisition of Control
of, and Merger with, National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 33283, CAB Order No. 80-1-
125 (Jan. 18, 1980).
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years.5 Eastern Air Lines spent $3.4 million in its unsuccessful attempt
to acquire National,6 but after unfavorable decisions from both an ad-
ministrative law judge7 and the full C.A.B.,' dropped out. Tiny Air
Florida also was unsuccessful in its limited merger application.9 Ironi-
cally, the new Pan Am has continued to have problems since the
merger, losing $126.9 million from air transport operations in its first
year of combined operations' ° and another $217.6 million during the
first six months of 1981."
This article will examine what the Miami Herald termed the "big-
gest and most complex airline merger case ever," in which National
Airlines became the "world's most wanted airline."' 2 The multi-faceted
National Airlines case is not only significant in itself; but because it
came at a time when the United States commercial aviation industry
was undergoing great change, primarily due to the drastically altered
5. For a recent history of Pan American, see R. DALEY, AN AMERICAN SAGA -
JUAN TRIPPE AND His PAN AMERICAN EMPIRE (1980).
6. Eastern to Halt Pursuit of National, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 8, 1979,
at 29.
7. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control
of National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 34226 (June 14, 1979) (initial decision of Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Richard J. Murphy).
8. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control
of National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 34226, CAB Order No. 79-12-74 (Dec. 17,
1979) (dismissing the application).
9. Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1979, at 29, col. 1. Air Florida, unlike the other appli-
cants, was only seeking permission to acquire National's international routes and four
of its wide-bodied DC-10's. Id.
10. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1981).
Actually Pan Am showed a net income of $80.3 million, but this was from the gain of
some $294 million it showed from the sale of its office building in New York City. Id.
11. Merzer, Pan Am Eyes Shifting Base to S. Florida, Miami Herald, Aug. 15,
1981, § A, at 1, col. 5. Pan Am international operations were particularly hard hit by
the astronomic rise in world-wide fuel prices and competition from foreign government-
supported flag carriers as well as American carriers encouraged by the passage of the
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94
Stat. 35 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.).
12. Baron, Now Stockholders Get Their Turn in National Fight, Miami Herald,
May 13, 1979, § F, at 1, col. 5. One reason other airlines were interested in National
was that the asset value of its undervalued stock was between $60-$75 per share.
Therefore, even a purchase price of $50 a share would be a bargain, particularly in
view of National's low debt load. Id.
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regulatory climate, it illustrates the effects of that change.
The C.A.B. initially signalled the pending deregulation,13 which
was greatly expanded and codified in the Airline Deregulation Act of
197814 [A.D.A.]. The A.D.A. changed the public interest test which
the C.A.B. used to make decisions under antitrust statutes,15 delineated
the burden of proof for opponents and proponents of a merger, 6 set
time limits for C.A.B. approval17 and limited the reviewing power of
the President.' It also included labor-protective provisions for workers
adversely affected by the A.D.A.,1 9 and provided for eventual elimina-
tion of the C.A.B.20
After a brief overview of general merger and anti-trust law and
philosohphy, this article reviews pre-A.D.A. airline mergers under the
1938 and 1958 Aviation Acts.21 Next the 1978 A.D.A. is discussed.
The various proposed mergers with National are analyzed, beginning
with brief histories of each of the airlines involved and a chronology of
merger and post-merger events. Finally the various administrative law
13. C.A.B. End Set in Air Deregulation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1978, § 1, at 79,
col. 1.
14. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(amending 49 U.S.C. § § 1301 et seq.). A partial legislative history of the Act may be
found in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3737. For an earlier Senate Report by
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee chaired by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the Air-
line Deregulation Act's chief sponsor, see SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRAC. &
PROC., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 1st SEss., CIVIL AERONAU-
TICS BOARD PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES (Comm. Print 1975) (hereinafter C.A.B.
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES).
15. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1979). Opponents of a merger have
the burden of proof as to the anticompetitive effects and proponents have the burden of
proof that it meets significant transportation conveniences and needs, which may not be
met by less anticompetitive means.
17. 49 U.S.C. § 1490 (Supp. III 1979).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976 & Supp. 1111979). In international cases, the Presi-
dent must base his decision solely upon foreign relations or national defense criteria
and not upon economic or carrier selection criteria.
19. 49 U.S.C. § 1552 (Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying notes 164-76
infra.
20. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying note 70 infra.
21. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973
and Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 731.
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judges' decisions and Board orders related to the National merger at-
tempts are discussed and compared with other post-A.D.A. merger
decisions.
Background
Federal Regulation of Big Business
In response to the huge trusts and corporations established in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century by the so-called robber barons,22
the United States Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act" in
1890. In 1914 the Clayton Act24 was passed in an effort to strengthen
22. 54 Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices (hereinafter Monopolies) § 1 (1971), which principally cites Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat.
209). See generally 54 Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies § § 1-108 (1971); 58 C.J.S. Monopo-
lies § § 17-25 (1948). Basically, 15 U.S.C. section 1 deals with means of monopolizing
and section 2 deals with the results to be achieved. Section 1 states in part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Id. § 2.
24. The Clayton Act can be found at 15 U.S.C. § § 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27,
and 44, and at 29 U.S.C. § § 52-53. (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch.
323, 38 Stat. 730). See generally 54 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies §§ 109-139 (1971); 58
C.J.S. Monopolies § 26 (1948). Rather than being broad and general like the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act concentrates on certain specified practices that Congress believed
were anticompetitive and permitted economic concentration, but which the various
courts had held to be outside the coverage of the Sherman Act. 54 AM. JuR. 2d, Mo-
nopolies § 1096 (1971). Among the proscribed practices are: discrimination in price,
services or facilities (15 U.S.C. § 13) sale on agreement not to use goods of competitors
(§ 14); with various exceptions, acquisition of stock in one corporation by another cor-
poration (§ 18); interlocking directorates in certain situations (§ 19); purchases by
4
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the Sherman Act. While the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment is responsible for federal enforcement of the various federal anti-
trust laws,25 private individuals may also bring suits and seek treble
damages.2 6 But the current political climate is once again favoring big
business; "bigness in business does not necessarily mean badness. 27
Thus, a number of extremely large corporate mergers have taken place
in the last several years. 28
Pre-Deregulation Airline Mergers
The early history of the American commercial aviation industry is
inexorably tied to that of the United States Post Office. The latter pro-
vided funds for airport and airway development and subsidized airmail
contracts. The four big airlines before the Pan Am merger, United,
American, T.W.A. and Eastern, can all trace their present prominence
to this early period. 9 Under the Black-McKellar Act,30 during an in-
common carriers in case of interlocking directorates (§ 20). Private individuals or cor-
porations who are hurt by the above activities may obtain treble damages and reasona-
ble attorney fees (§ 15) or may sue for injunctive relief (§ 26). Also a judgment ob-
tained by the Government under this Act may be used as prima facie evidence of an
antitrust violation in a private suit. (§ 16).
25. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1978-1979, at 352-53.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15 states in part: "Any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the Antitrust Laws may sue
therefore. .. ."
27. Alexander, Beckwith & Ungeheuer, Reaching for Conoco's Riches, TIME,
July 27, 1981, at 50, quoting Attorney General William French Smith. For a sampling
of the Reagan philosophy, compare R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) with MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d
ed. E. Mansfield 1974); RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND
COMPETITION: THE MONOPOLY MAKERS (M. Green ed. 1973).
28. Strout, Merger Action Boom Going Full Steam, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 2,
1981, § FF, at 2, col. 1. The author noted that first quarter 1981 merger bids were a
record $17.5 billion and that 1980 had previously set a record with mergers of $44.3
billion. The largest, Dupont-Conoco at 7.3 billion dollars, took place in 1981. Id.
29. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14, at 29-35 and 195-215.
In 1938, when the Civil Aeronautics Act became effective, these four airlines ac-
counted for 82.5% of all revenue passenger miles flown and in 1972 they still accounted
for 60% of all revenue passenger miles flown. Id. at 6. See also A. LOWENFIELD, AvI-
ATION LAW, § 1 (1972). For a recent and comprehensive history of commercial avia-
tion in the United States, see C. SOLBERG, CONQUEST OF THE SKIES: A HISTORY OF
411
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terim period from 1934 to 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission
worked with the Post Office Department to regulate airmail contracts.
The Black-McKellar Act also established a five member Federal Avia-
tion Commission to study commercial aviation and make recommenda-
tions to Congress."' The eventual result of these recommendations was
the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.32 Twenty years later
Congress passed the similar, but expanded, Federal Aviation Act of
1958.
During the forty years the C.A.B. functioned prior to deregulation,
mergers reduced the original sixteen domestic trunk lines to ten." Lo-
cal service carriers, which first came into existence after World War II,
were reduced through mergers from nineteen to nine.35 Between 1938
and 1973, eight domestic trunkline merger applications were denied or
disapproved and fifteen applications resulted in eventual mergers.
Others were withdrawn or dismissed."
Lucile Sheppard Keyes, an economist who has written much on
the subject of economic deregulation of commercial aviation, traced the
COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN AMERICA (1979).
30. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933. This Act provided competitive
bidding for airmail contracts, curtailed the Postmaster General's discretion in letting
contracts, placed a ceiling on total airmail route miles authorized, gave responsibility
for contract modifications to the I.C.C., outlawed aviation holding companies and lim-
ited the number of contracts each airline could have. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCE-
DURES, supra note 14, at 206-07.
31. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933. The Commissson reported back
with 102 recommendations, including the establishment of an independent regulatory
agency. President Roosevelt, however, favored extending the authority of the I.C.C. to
cover aviation. The legislation was stalled for three years in Congress because of the
inability to decide whether to use the I.C.C. or establish an independent agency. Fi-
nally the concept of an independent agency won and the legislation quickly went for-
ward. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14, at 208.
32. Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973. See generally C. RHYNE, CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED (1939).
33. Act of August 23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731. The economic
regulation provisions were continued practically verbatim; among others, provisions re-
lating to the Federal Aviation Administration were added.
34. C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14, at 6.
35. Id. at 6 and 222.
36. Id. at 252.
142 Nova Law Journal
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history of U.S. airline mergers, dividing it into four periods.37 During
the first period from 1938 through the late forties, the C.A.B. main-
tained a strongly competitive attitude. This was followed by a period
running through the mid-fifties, during which the Board actively en-
couraged mergers, approving several mergers with considerable an-
ticompetitive effects. The third period, from the mid-fifties through the
late sixties, saw the approval of only one airline merger, that under the
"failing business" doctrine. This was followed by a four-year period
which saw the approval of four merger proposals, each improving .the
financial stability of at least one of the airlines.38
Oren T. Chicamoto analyzed the various factors considered by the
C.A.B. in pre-deregulation merger applications.3 9 While the Board
stated that mergers would be considered on a case by case basis with-
out reference to precedents,'40 it nevertheless considered common fac-
tors under §408 of the 1958 Act. In determining whether the proposed
merger would be in the public interest, the Board balanced benefits,
such as efficiency and economy, route integration and improved ser-
vices,41 against disadvantages, such as diversion from competing carri-
37. Keyes, Notes on the History of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J.
AIR L. & Com. 357 (1971).
38. Id. at 357. During the first period the C.A.B. proclaimed its pro-competive-
ness in its decisions denying merger approval: United Air Lines Transport Corp., Ac-
quisition of Western Air Express Corp., I C.A.B. 739 (1940) and American Airlines,
Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 365 (1946). A
significant change in policy was announced by the C.A.B. during the second period:
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1950). The one merger approved
under the "failing business doctrine" during the third period was the takeover of Capi-
tal by United. United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961). Only three of the
four mergers approved during the fourth period were consummated. Frontier and Cen-
tral; Pacific, West Coast and Bonanza; Allegheny and Lake Central were the three
local service mergers which were approved. The Northeast and Northwest merger was
approved but the transfer of the previously approved Miami to Los Angeles route was
not immediately approved and Northwest withdrew. Keyes, supra note 37.
39. Chicamoto, Domestic Mergers in the Airline Industry: C.A.B. Approval and
Antitrust, 11 HAWAII B.J. 3 (1974). See also Travers, An Examination of the C.A.B.'s
Merger Policy, 15 KAN. L. REV. 227 (1967); Crooker, Airline Mergers in the 1970's,
39 J. AIR L. & Com. 143 (1973); Reid & Mohrfeld, Airline Size, Profitability, Merg-
ers and Regulation, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 167 (1973).
40. Chicamoto, supra note 39, at 7-8.
41. Id. at 8-10.
16: 1981 431Airline Deregulation & Merger
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ers, competitive balance after merger and the intent of the general an-
titrust laws. 2  Additionally, other factors were examined: the
reasonableness of the proposed purchase price, protective labor condi-
tions for employees of both carriers, the applicant's guilt of prior and
present antitrust violations, and the overall effect of the proposed
merger on local service carriers.43
The United States Supreme Court has provided analytical tools
for the Board, such as the "failing business" doctrine, to sanction a
merger that would otherwise be quite anticompetitive." The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction has often been invoked by various courts, including
the Supreme Court, to permit C.A.B. examination and judgment on
purported antitrust violations within its jurisdiction. This doctrine was
expanded considerably by the Court in Pan American World Airways
vs. United States" and in Hughes Tool Company vs. Trans World
Airlines47 where the Court held that in addition to any express exemp-
tions, there was an implied exemption from general antitrust statutes,
based on the Board's primary jurisdiction under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958.
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
Various reasons have been espoused to explain the rapid and un-
precedented congressional movement toward deregulation of the com-
mercial aviation industry: Public and political antipathy against gov-
ernment regulation in general; discontent with burdensome regulatory
schemes and agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health
42. Id. at 10-16.
43. Id. at 16-18.
44. United Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961). The Board specifically
cited International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291 (1929), the ini-
tial case in which the Supreme Court adopted the failing business doctrine to uphold
such a potentially anticompetitive merger.
45. See generally Coultas, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. Determination
of Express and Implied Immunity from the Antitrust Laws, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 559
(1973); Annot., 38 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1974); 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § § 788-
97 (1962).
46. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). See Note, Civil Aeronautics Board Held to Have Ex-
clusive Jurisdiction to Grant Injunctive Relief Against Acts Allegedly in Violation of
Antitrust Laws, 63 COLuM. L. REV. 923 (1963).
47. 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/3
6:1981 Airline Deregulation & Merger 45 I
Act, 8 and the agency it spawned; economic factors affecting the indus-
try, such as wildly escalating fuel costs, excess capacity afforded by
new wide-body jets and the success of intra-state carriers; the nearly
unanimous academic and public opinion that regulation could only lead
to greater inefficiency and higher fares for the traveling public; and a
growing coalition of politicians and academic and governmental econo-
mists that started deregulation through C.A.B. regulations and intro-
duced and supported legislation until they were successful. 49
Certainly one of the most significant and pervasive sections of the
A.D.A. is that declaring Congressional policy.50 With respect to inter-
state and overseas air transportation, ten factors replaced the original
six. 5 1 These factors, considered to be in the public interest and in accor-
dance with public convenience and necessity, are:
1. maintenance of safety as the highest priority in air commerce;
2. prevention of any deterioration in presently established safety
procedures;
48. 29 U.S.C. § § 651 et seq.
49. Thornton, Deregulation: The C.A.B. and Its Critics, 43 J. AIR L. & COM.
641 (1977); Callison, Airline Deregulation-Only Partially a Hoax: The Current Status
of the Airline Deregulation Movement, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 961 (1980); Kellener,
Deregulation and the Practicing Attorney, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 261 (1978). During
the three year period that deregulation was being debated in the Congress, it was also
being debated in the journals; see, e.g., Brenner, Need for Continued Economic Regu-
lation of Air Transport, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 793 (1975); Callison, Airline Deregula-
tion-A Hoax?, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 747 (1975); Levine, Alternatives to Regulation
Competition in Air Transportation and the Aviation Act of 1975, 41 J. AIR L. & COM.
703 (1975); Thayer, And Now 'The Deregulators: When Will They Learn? 43 J. AIR
L. & COM. 661 (1977). For a legislative history, see C.A.B. PRACTICES AND PROCE-
DURES, supra note 14; Styles, Commuter Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 685 n.1 (1980) (listing pre-A.D.A. hearings).
50. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
51. In summary, the six original factors were: 1) Encourage and develop the air
transportation system, 2) Regulate air transportation in such a way as to assure the
highest degree of safety and foster sound economic conditions, 3) Promote adequate,
economical and efficient service without unjust discrimination, preferences or unfair
competition, 4) Maintain necessary competition to assure the sound development of the
air transportation system, 5) Promote air safety, 6) Promote, encourage and develop
civil aeronautics. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 102. Congress readopted these
factors as the six factors to be considered in the area of foreign air transportation. 49
U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
9
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3. availability of a variety of adequate, efficient and low-priced
services withoug using unfair or deceptive practices, while encouraging
fair wages and equitable working conditions;
4. maximum reliance on competition in the market place;
5. development and maintenance of a sound, responsive and
prompt regulatory climate, which adapts to the country's needs;
6. development of services in major urban centers through secon-
dary and satellite airports where possible;
7. prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory or anticompetitive
practices and avoidance of unreasonable concentration, excessive mar-
ket domination and monopoly powers;
8. maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient system of
scheduled airline service for small communities;
9. development of the air transportation system by relying on
actual and potential competition;
10. encouraging new carriers to enter the system, encouraging
established carriers to enter new markets and strengthening small
carriers.52
The subsequent International Air Transportation Competition Act
[I.A.T.C.A.] of 197911 deleted the A.D.A.'s six foreign air transporta-
tion factors, merging them with those for interstate and overseas air
transportation, and added two extra factors for all three types of air
transportation: 54
11. promote, encourage and develop civil aeronautics and a via-
ble, privately owned United States air transport industry;
12. strengthen the competitive position of U.S. commercial avia-
tion to assure at least equality with foreign carriers and to maintain
and increase profitability in foreign air transportation.
The procedures for a merger proposal are governed by 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378. Subpart A, generally unchanged, lists those consolidations,
mergers and acquisitions that are unlawful, unless approved by the
C.A.B . 5 The Board's decision process has been outlined:
52. Id. § 1302(a).
53. Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (amending 49 U.S.C. § § 1301 et seq.). A
partial legislative history of this act may be found at 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 54.
54. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
55. Id. § 1378(a). The section providing presumption of control of an air carrier
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/3
Airline Deregulation & Merger6:1981
Unless, after a hearing, the Board finds that the transaction will
not be consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of
this section will not be fulfilled, it shall, by order, approve such
transaction, upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be
just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may pre-
scribe, except the Board shall not approve such transaction-
(A) if it would result in a monopoly or would be in further-
ance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt
to monopolize the business of air transportation in any region of
the United States; or
(B) the effect of which in any region of the United States may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade,
unless the Board finds that the anticompetitive effects of the pro-
posed transaction are outweighed in the public interest by the prob-
able effect of the transaction in meeting significant transportation
conveniences and needs of the public, and unless it finds that such
significant transportation conveniences and needs may not be satis-
fied by a reasonably available alternative having materially less an-
ticompetitive effects.
The party challenging the transaction shall bear the burden of
proving the anticompetitive effects of such transaction, and the pro-
ponents of the transaction shall bear the burden of proving that it
meets the significant transportation conveniences and needs of the
public and that such convenience and needs may not be satisfied by
a less anticompetitive alternative.58
Thus, the Board must base its determinations on three distinct tests:
(1) the Sherman Act test, (2) the Clayton Act test and (3) the public
interest and convenience test.5
where 10% or more of its stock is owned by any person remains unchanged. Id. §
1378(0 (1976). If one or more of the parties to the transaction come within the pur-
view of the C.A.B., an application must be filed with the Board with copies sent to the
Attorney General and Secretary of Transportation. The Board must notify the appli-
cant(s) and others with a substantial interest in the proceedings of the manner in which
the Board will proceed. Id. § 1378(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
56. Id.
57. The relationship or order of these three tests is a significant issue discussed in
both the TXI-Pan Am decision and the Eastern decision. See text accompanying notes
105-109 and 112-115 infra.
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Interlocking relationships of officers, directors, or stockholders
with controlling interests in air carriers, common carriers or a person
"substantially engaged in the business of aeronautics" are still unlaw-
ful, unless approved by the C.A.B. as being in the public interest.5 8
Pooling and other agreements between domestic and foreign air carri-
ers are subject not only to a public interest test, but also to an anticom-
petition test.5" Mutual aid agreements are treated separately.60 They
may only be approved if they are limited to cover sixty percent of an
air carrier's direct operating expenses, do not start for thirty days after
the beginning of the labor strike, last no longer than eight weeks and
the air carrier agrees to binding arbitration under the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act, if the union so requests.6'
The President of the United States still has final authority with
respect to foreign air transportation; his approval is necessary whenever
the merger is between carriers flying international routes. However, the
A.D.A. limits his power to national defense and foreign relations con-
58. 49 U.S.C. § 1379 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
59. Id. § 1382. Under the A.D.A. the agreements are simply referred to as "pos-
sible cooperative working arrangements," without further defining them. Id. §
1382(a)(1) (Supp. 1979). Previously such agreements were delineated:
agreement. . . for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service,
or equipment, or relating to the establishment of transportation rates,
fares, charges, or classifications, or for preserving and improving safety,
economy, and efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating,
preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive, or wasteful
competition, or for regulating stops, schedules, and character of service, or
for other cooperative working arrangements.
Id.; FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 412. Procedures for reviewing such agree-
ments are statutorily outlined including prior notification to certain Cabinet officers
before approval, so written comments may be filed or hearings requested. 49 U.S.C. §
1382(b) (1976 & Supp. 1979). Deliniation of burdens of proof are also included. Id. §
1382(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1979).
60. Id. § 1382(e). Mutual aid agreement is defined as
any contract or agreement between air carriers which provides that any
such air carrier will receive payments from the other air carriers which are
parties to such contract or agreement for any period during which such air
carrier is not engaging in air transportation, or is providing reduced levels
of service in air transportation, due to a labor strike.
Id. § 1382(e)(3)(A).
61. Id. § 1382(e)(2).
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siderations. He may not disapprove upon the basis of economic or car-
rier selection considerations.62
The A.D.A. also changed 49 U.S.C. § 1384, retitled Antitrust Ex-
emptions.6 3 The antitrust exemption is no longer automatic with the
C.A.B.'s approval of the transaction. Before antitrust exemption may
be given, the Board must specifically find exemption is required in the
public interest.64 A 1980 amendment to this section now provides that
the Board shall by order exempt any person "to the extent necessary to
enable such person to proceed with the transaction specifically -ap-
proved . . . and transactions necessarily contemplated by such
order." '65
To preclude deliberate stalling tactics by the Board, the A.D.A.
set specific time limits for Board decisions; for Section 1378 applica-
tions, the final order must be rendered within six months.66
62. Id. § 1461(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979). In his letter of December 22, 1979,
approving the Pan American-National merger, President Carter noted his limited re-
view power. Letter from President Carter to C.A.B. Chairman Marvin Cohen dated
Dec. 22, 1979, reprinted at Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan Am-
Acquisition of and Merger with National, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, C.A.B. Order
Nos. 79-12-163, 79-12-164, and 79-12-165 (Oct. 24, 1979).
63. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976 & Supp. 1979):
In any order made under section 1378, 1379 or 1382 of this title, the
Board may, as part of such order, exempt any person affected by such
order from the operations of the "antitrust laws" set forth in subsection (a)
of section 12 of Title 15 to the extent necessary to enable such person to
proceed with the transaction specifically approved by the Board in such
order and those transactions necessarily contemplated by such order, ex-
cept that the Board may not exempt such person unless it determines that
such exemption is required in the public interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. In the Texas International/Pan American-National merger case, the
Board was asked to grant antitrust exemption to the proposed mergers, but after ana-
lyzing the A.D.A. and the arguments presented specifically declined to do so. Texas
International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of Control of, and
Merger with National Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, C.A.B. Orders
79-12-163, 79-12-164 and 79-12-165 (October 24, 1979). See also Beane, The Anti-
trust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 1001 (1980).
65. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 as amended by section 27 International Air Transportation
Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35, 47-48. It would appear that
the amendment goes a long way towards an automatic exemption again.
66. 49 U.S.C. § 1490 (Supp. 1979).
49 11 6:1981
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In another significant section, the A.D.A. established an employee
protection program for employees who had been employed by a certifi-
cated air carrier for four years as of the beginning of the A.D.A. and
who were deprived of either employment or compensation as a result of
bankruptcy or "major contraction"6 7 "the major cause of which is the
change in regulatory structure provided by the A.D.A."68 Monthly as-
sistance payments may be made until the protected employee finds
other employment or for 72 months maximum. Relocation assistance
may also be provided. After their own furloughed employees have been
called back, certificated carriers have a duty to hire protected employ-
ees before hiring any non-protected employee similarly qualified. 9
Most significant are the A.D.A.'s sunset provisions prescribing a
three-phase termination of C.A.B. authority, with complete phase-out
on January 1, 1985, unless Congress intervenes. Board authority to
pass on mergers ceases on January 1, 1983, and is transferred to the
Department of Justice. 0
67. Id. § 1552(h)(4) defines "major contraction" as being "a reduction of at
least 71/2 percent of the total number of full time employees of an air carrier within a
12 month period." Id. However, the C.A.B. may also determine that it is a major
contraction if less than 7 percent. Strikers are not to be included. Id.
68. 49 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2) (Supp. 1979). However, this program is limited to
the first 10 calendar years occurring after October 28, 1979, the date that the A.D.A.
became effective. Id.
69. Id. § 1552. For an interesting history and explanation of this provision and
similar provisions for railroad employees, see Ris, Government Protection of Transpor-
tation Employees: Sound Policy or Costly Precedent?, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 509
(1979). The historical reasons for labor protective provisions in the railroad industry
have not necessarily been present in the commercial aviation industry. In fact until the
A.D.A., Congress did not mandate such provisions as it had in the railroad industry;
the C.A.B. nevertheless administratively applied them starting in 1950 in United-West-
ern Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950).
70. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. 1979). The Board is also required to make a com-
prehensive review of its activities and present this review to the Congress no later than
January 1, 1984. It is to recommend to Congress whether it should be continued in
existence after 1985 and what changes should be made to further the goals of the
A.D.A. The A.D.A. lists in great detail the elements and factors to be considered dur-
ing the compehensive review. Id. It was reported that the Transportation Department
would support legislation which would move the sunset date up from 1985 to 1982.
Transportation Department Backs Early C.A.B. Sunset, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.
Apr. 7, 1980, at 32.
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Ironically the A.D.A. preempted to the federal government all au-
thority over rates, routes or services of certificated carriers.7 Liberal-
ized route application procedures and awards were provided the
A.D.A., 2 including an automatic market entry program73 and a means
to obtain unused authority. 4 Carriers obtained flexibility in rate
changes; a "standard industry fare level" 75 was established between
city-pairs and carriers could adjust their fare no more than 5% upward
or 50% downward from this level without C.A.B. authority.78 In 1980
I.A.T.C.A. established a similar "standard foreign fare level" and
71. 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. 1979). This is ironic because one of the primary
reasons advanced in support of deregulation was the economic and regulatory success
of intrastate carriers operating under California and Texas state authorities. See Note,
Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Regulatory
Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965); Means & Chasnoff, State Regulation of Air Trans-
portation: The Texas Aeronautics Commission, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 653 (1975).
72. 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976 & Supp. 1979). Among other provisions in this
lengthy section, the C.A.B. is authorized to establish simplified procedural rules for
route applications. See generally The Line Forms Here for Air Routes, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 6, 1978, at 66; Deregulation Spurs Airport Problems, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Nov. 3, 1980, at 55; Tinnin, Alexander & Hannifin, Fasten Your Seat Belts, TIME,
Aug. 4, 1980, at 47; Marbach, Buckley, et al. Silver Lining in the Air, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 24, 1981, at 52.
73. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(7) (Supp. 1979). Basically this section provides that
each certificated air carrier may apply for (and generally will be automatically given)
route authority for one city pair during the first thirty days of 1979, 1980 and 1981. If
the Board either determines that the air carrier is not fit, willing and able to provide
such non-stop service or that the air carrier is not the only air carrier to be given that
particular city pair under the automatic market entry program, it may reapply for
another city pair within the first one hundred and twenty days of the year. Id.
74. Id. § 1371 (d)(5)(A) (Supp. 1979). Basically an air carrier must provide a
minimum of five round trips per week between two points or city pairs for which it has
route authority for at least thirteen weeks during any twenty-six week period or any
other air carrier may apply for such unused route authority thirty days after the end of
the twenty-six week period. Id.
75. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. 1979) which is defined as the
"fare level in effect on July 1, 1977, for each interstate or overseas pair of points, for
each class of service, existing on that date. . . ." Semiannually the Board will make
adjustments proportional to the percentage change "in the actual operating cost per
available seat mile for interstate and overseas transportation combined." Id.
§ 1482(d)(6)(B).
76. Id. § 1482(d)(4).
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range of reasonableness for foreign fare adjustments." Subsidized
"guaranteed essential air transportation" for those small communities
that have lost all air service as a result of deregulation was also pro-
vided.78 Finally, the A.D.A. amended the 1957 Guaranty of Loans for
Purchase of Aircraft and Equipment Act to encompass guaranties for
"charter air carriers," "commuter air carriers," and "intrastate air
carriers."7 9
Proposed National Mergers
Description of the Airlines
To more clearly understand this complicated merger, it is neces-
sary to briefly examine and compare each of the five airlines involved.
Prior to the merger each of the five airlines was in a different stage of
development and was practically, if not theoretically and legally, a dif-
ferent category of air carrier.80 Each of the four courtiers had a differ-
77. Id. § 1482(j)(6). See generally Is the U.S. Sabotaging Its International Air-
lines?, Bus. WK., Jan. 26, 1981, at 74.
78. 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (Supp. 1979).
79. 49 U.S.C. § 1380.
80.
ITEM (1978) NAL PAN AM EAL TXI AF
Employees 8,040 26,964 35,899 2,949 500
Equipment
Total planes 55 95 257 28 7
Wide-bodied
jets 15 43 41 ......
Passengers 6,983* 8,675 37,819 3,987 498
enplaned (11)** (10) (2) (19) (na)
Revenue 7,892,599* 21,054,983 25,183,415 1,560,554 181,000
Passenger (10)** (6) (4) (16) (na)
Miles
Passenger 587,782* 1,631,798 2,150,577 158,185 15,350
Revenue ($) (10)** (6) (3) (19) (na)
Profits ($) 18,309* 118,801 67,257 12,850 132
152
452,952* 2,048,303 1,908,556 95,200 11,474
Nova Law Journal
Assets ($)
6: 1981 1
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ent reason for wanting to merge with National.
National, the smallest of the domestic trunklines, first began flying
in 1934, carrying the mail between St. Petersburg, Florida, and Day-
tona Beach, Florida. By 1970 National's routes generally ran from
Florida to Washington and New York City, and from Florida across
the southern tier of states to California. It was awarded the Miami-
London transatlantic route in 1970, and has since steadily expanded
into Europe. Prior to the merger it flew from Florida to London, Paris,
Amsterdam and Frankfurt."1 Its stock was undervalued.82
Pan American World Airways was unique among United States
airlines because, for all practical purposes, it was strictly an interna-
tional airline. It too traced its roots to Florida. On October 28, 1927, it
first flew from Key West, Florida, to Havana, Cuba. In 1947 the com-
pany provided the first scheduled around-the-world service.83 In 1974,
it was thought Pan Am would follow Penn-Central into bankruptcy,
but this was avoided by better management procedures and elimination
of excess management personnel.84 More recently the airline faced two
problems; increasing international competition from other American
airlines and continued competition from foreign airlines, such as Air
*Add 000 **Rank among ATA carriers
AIR FLORIDA SYSTEM, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT (n.d.); EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.,
1978 ANNUAL REPORT (1979); NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT
(n.d.); PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 1978; AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, AIR TRANSPORT 1979 (1979); Cook, Lorenzo
the Presumptuous, FORBES, Oct. 30, 1978, at 115; Baron, New Aircraft, Increased
Traffic Push Air Florida into the Black, Miami Herald, Nov. 18, 1978, § B, at 4, col.
1; BARRON'S, Oct. 10, 1977, at 39; PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., THE PAN
AMERICAN MERGER (n.d.).
81. NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., NATIONAL AIRLINES HISTORY, (n.d.).
82. See note 12 supra; Russell, They're Just Wild About National, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 24, 1978, § C, at 1, col. 4.
83. For histories of Pan American World Airways, Inc., see R. DALEY, AN
AMERICAN SAGA: JUAN TRIPPE AND HIS PAN AM EMPIRE (1980); C. SOLBERG, CON-
QUEST OF THE SKIES: A HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN AMERICA (1979); PAN
AMERICAN WORLD, INC., THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF PAN AM-THE STORY OF PAN AMER-
ICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. FROM 1927 TO 1977 (n.d.); PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIR-
WAYS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1979 (1980).
84. See generally Pan Am In the Black-For-Now, Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1977, at
52; Cook, Pan American: Coming Home, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1978, at 47; Griffiths, Pan
Am Cutback Geared to Profits, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 18, 1978, at 34.
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France, Alitalia and Lufthansa, which are owned and/or heavily subsi-
dized by their respective governments.85 Increased American competi-
tion reduced Pan Am's domestic feeder traffic. Thus Pan Am was de-
sirous of obtaining its own domestic system more quickly and less
expensively than building one from scratch. Pan Am expected that
National would best connect Pan Am's transpacific, transatlantic and
Latin American operations, and enable better utilization of equipment
since Pan Am peaked during the summer tourist season and National
peaked during Florida's winter season. 6
Eastern Air Lines, as its name implies, generally concentrated its
route system in the eastern United States, with major hubs at Miami,
Atlanta, Washington and New York. It also served Eastern Canada,
Mexico and the Caribbean. Eastern was the second largest domestic
trunkline in the United States before the Pan Am-National merger.87
Eastern's present president, Colonel Frank Borman, appears to be
bringing the company out of a severe financial crisis, which saw it lose
nearly ninety million dollars in 1975.88 Two major problems appeared
to face the proposed Eastern-National merger. One was the fact that
the two airlines were major competitors on the important northeast-
Florida routes. The other was the resultant size of the combined
company. 9
Texas International (TXI), originally known as Trans-Texas Air-
85. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., THE PAN AM-NATIONAL MERGER
(n.d.); ANNUAL REPORT 1979 20 (1980) and Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
S.E.C. Form 10-K (1978) (S.E.C. file # 103532) (1979). For a description of state
ownership characteristics of various I.A.T.A. airlines, see generally P. HAANAPPEL,
RATEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT - A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF INTER-
NATIONAL AIR FARES AND RATES 37-39 (1978).
86. ANNUAL REPORT 1979, supra note 68; Hice, Pan Am-National Merger:
Where Will All the People Fit?, FLORIDA TREND, Apr. 1980, at 150. Union seniority
and meshing problems have prevented the cross-utilization of equipment that was ex-
pected. Id. See also text accompanying notes 165-69 infra.
87. Pan Am replaced Eastern in second place, behind United, when the merger
became effective. Hobson & Golden, Merged Pan Am Slashes Fares, Miami News,
Jan. 7, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 1. See generally R. SERLING, FROM THE CAPTAIN- TO THE
COLONEL - AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF EASTERN AIRLINES (1980); E. RICKENBAKER,
RICKENBAKER - AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1967).
88. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., GROWTH, CHALLENGE CHARACTERIZE EASTERN
AIRLINES FIRST 50 YEARS (1979).
89. See text accompanying notes 143-47 infra.
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ways, was a small local service airline. In 1967 it was rescued from a
crippling debt load of over twenty million dollars by two Harvard
M.B.A.'s, Frank Lorenzo and Robert Carney, who were able to recapi-
talize the company through innovative and aggressive management,
turning it into one of the industry's most exciting companies. Texas
International's daring in trying to gain control of National brought the
company at least forty-five million dollars in profits on the sale of its
National stock.90 After realizing the profit from the sale of its stock to
Pan Am, Texas International sought to acquire T.W.A. and currently
has C.A.B. approval to acquire Continental Airlines.91
Until the A.D.A. Air Florida was strictly an intrastate carrier.
Deregulation and an infusion of new capital permitted the once strug-
gling airline to expand its route system to the Northeast, the Carib-
bean, Central America and Europe.92 Like the other so-called Na-
tional-merger losers, Air Florida has grown and prospered more than
the "new" Pan Am.
Chronology of Events
While this article focuses on the airline regulatory process, it is
important to realize that concurrent with the C.A.B. hearings there
was a massive corporate scramble on other fronts, involving the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and the shareholders of the involved
corporations. These are here summarized. 93
Texas International Airlines set this incredible chain of events in
motion on July 10, 1978 when it announced it had already purchased
9.2% of National's common stock. On August 22, 1978 Pan American
World Airways joined in battle against Texas International, also seek-
ing C.A.B. approval for its proposed merger with National Airlines.
Shortly thereafter Pan American and National executed a definitive
merger agreement. The C.A.B. consolidated these two merger applica-
tions, but later refused to consolidate Eastern Airlines' application,
when, on December 11, 1978, it likewise indicated an interest in ac-
quiring its chief rival on the East Coast-Florida market. Throughout,
90. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
91. See text accompanying notes 148-62 infra.
92. AIR FLORIDA SYSTEM INC., AIR FLORIDA BACKGROUND (n.d.).
93. For a full chronology, see Appendix A.
55116: 1981
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Air Florida's only interest was the acquisition of National's interna-
tional routes and four of its DC-10's.
Meanwhile, on October 28, 1978, President Carter signed into law
the A.D.A., which not only deregulated the domestic airline industry,
but also significantly changed the rules for airline mergers. Later
I.A.T.C.A. was also enacted, much to Pan American's detriment.
Eventually an auction system was proposed and accepted by Na-
tional's shareholders, which would permit five rounds of bidding be-
tween Pan American and Eastern, should each obtain C.A.B. approval.
The Texas International, Pan American and Eastern applications were
all rejected by the respective administrative law judges. Finally the full
Board approved both Texas International's and Pan American's merger
applications, despite the fact that Texas International had informed the
Board it had already agreed to sell its National stock to Pan American
for a handsome profit. Throughout the summer of 1979 Pan American
increased its ownership of National.
In September 1979 the full C.A.B. tentatively rejected Eastern's
merger application and shortly thereafter Eastern dropped out of
contention.
President Carter formally approved the Pan American-National
merger in December 1979 and the merger became effective in January
1980. Since the merger, management problems, labor seniority meshing
problems, continued and expanded deregulation, high fuel costs and the
economy in general have all combined to raise the spectre of possible
bankruptcy. First the airline sold its New York City headquarters to
raise badly needed cash, then its profitable InterContinental Hotel sub-
sidiary. Only time will tell whether Pan American World Airways will
realize the expected benefits from its merger with National Airlines
and even whether the "new" Pan Am will survive.
C.A.B. Decisions
Although not the first merger decision after the adoption of the
A.D.A. merger tests,94 the C.A.B. decision in the Texas International/
94. The C.A.B.'s first affirmative decision created Republic Airlines from North
Central and Southern. Since the two airlines served different regions of the United
States, there was little, if any, anticompetitive effect on the airline industry. Thus the
Board opinion offered no real analysis or rationale. North Central-Southern Merger
156 6: 1981 1
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Pan American-National Case95 gives the greatest expository insight
into the Board's interpretation of the A.D.A. merger provisions.
Handed down one year after the adoption of the A.D.A., this lengthy
opinion approved both the proposed acquisition of National by Texas
International and the proposed acquisition and merger of National with
Pan American, despite contrary recommendation by the administrative
law judge. 6 This Board opinion is analyzed and compared with the
earlier decision by Administrative Law Judge William Dapper. The in-
itial decision of Administrative Law Judge Richard Murphy recom-
mending denial of the Eastern-National acquisition application,9 7 the
decision of Administrative Law Judge John Vittone recommending ap-
proval of the second Continental-Western merger,9" and the C.A.B. de-
cision accepting such recommendation are also discussed below.99 The
latter Continental-Western decisions are examined because they shed
some light on the C.A.B.'s earlier decision denying the first Continen-
tal-Western merger application'"0 and because they show the changes
in the domestic airline industry since deregulation and the effect those
Case, Docket Nos. 33136 & 34430, C.A.B. Order Nos. 79-6-7 & 79-6-8 (May 15,
1979). For discussion and analysis of the first five merger/acquisition cases under the
A.D.A., see Keyes, A Preliminary Appraisal of Merger Control Under the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 71 (1980).
95. Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of
Control of, and Merger with National Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283,
C.A.B. Order Nos. 79-2-163, 79-12-164, 79-12-165 (Oct. 24, 1979) (hereinafter TXI/
Pan Am-National Order).
96. Texas International-National Acquisition Case/Pan American Acquisition of
Control of, and Merger with National Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283
(Decision of Administrative Law Judge William H. Dapper, Apr. 5, 1979) (hereinafter
TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision).
97. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control
of National Airlines, Inc. Docket No. 34226 (Decision of Administrative Law Judge
Richard J. Murphy, June 14, 1979) (hereinafter Eastern-National Judge Decision).
98. Continental-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 38733 (Decision of Adminis-
trative Law Judge John M. Vittone, Feb. 6, 1980) (hereinafter Continental-Western
Judge Decision).
99. Continental-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 38733, C.A.B. Order Nos.
81-6-1 & 81-6-2 (Mar. 31, 1981) (hereinafter Second Continental-Western Order).
100. Continental-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 33465, C.A.B. Order No.
79-9-185 (Sept. 27, 1979) (dismissing application) (hereinafter First Continental-
Western Order).
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changes have had on the C.A.B.'s consideration of merger applications.
Preliminary Decisions
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the C.A.B. initially de-
termined whether the proposed merger, consolidation or acquisition was
consistent with the public interest. The Board was further required to
disapprove proposals that would result in a monopoly or monopolies.10 1
In the first post-A.D.A. decision, Administrative Law Judge Saunders
commented upon the C.A.B.'s view of its antitrust role under the 1958
Act: "Under this interpretation of the prior law, the Board's antitrust
resolve was erratic; and with the broad discretion afforded by the 'pub-
lic interest' test, antitrust policy was often ignored. 1 °2
With the adoption of the A.D.A. Congress specifically intended to
subject proposed airline mergers or acquisitions to the same antitrust
standards to which other mergers are subject, with the proviso that if
the proposed merger failed the Sherman and Clayton Act tests, it
might nevertheless be approved if it passed the public interest test and
"no reasonably available less anticompetitive alternative"10 3 existed.
101. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973). Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, tit. IV, § 408, 72 Stat. 767 as amended,
stated (before the A.D.A.):
Unless after such hearing, the Board finds that the consolidation, merger,
purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control will not be
consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of this section will
not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve such consolidation, merger,
purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, upon such
terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with
such modifications as it may prescribe: Provided, that the Board shall not
approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or monop-
olies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not
a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract or
acquisition of control. ...
102. North Central-Southern Merger Case, Docket No. 33136 at 23 (Decision of
Administrative Law Judge Saunders, Feb. 9, 1979).
103. A.D.A. Legislative History, supra note 14, at 3789.
The intent of the new section 408 of the proposed legislation is to insure
that, in light of deregulation, mergers in the air carrier industry will be
tested by the antitrust standards traditionally applied by the courts to un-
regulated industries. However, under the new section 408, even if a merger
22
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The public interest tests under the A.D.A. are similar to those under
Section 102(a) of the Bank Merger Act of 1966.104
Because of substantial change in Section 408 of the Aviation
Act,10 5 which effectively altered the entire antitrust philosophy and
tests applied to the airline industry, the Board and the two administra-
tive law judges dealing with the various National merger cases had to
determine the section's intent and application. The two issues were:
first, whether the public interest test was separate from the antitrust
analysis or whether the antitrust analysis was only an important part of
the overall public interest test;108 and second, what criteria or factors
should be considered for the public interest test.107 Judge Dapper,
does not meet the antitrust standards of the Sherman and Clayton Acts it
may nonetheless be approved if it meets 'significant transportation needs of
the community to be served,' and if there is no 'reasonably available less
anticompetitive alternative' to the merger. These latter tests only apply if a
merger or similar transaction does not meet the Sherman and Clayton
standards. The 'public interest' standard in section 408(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 is retained in the new section, but the standard must
now be interpreted in light of the intent of Congress to move the airline
industry rapidly toward deregulation. The foundation of the new airline
legislation is that it is in the public interest to allow the airline industry to
be governed by the forces of the marketplace. Consistent with the premise,
mergers of air carriers should be governed by the same standards that are
applied to mergers of other firms.
The Sherman and Clayton Acts are more fully explained at notes 23-24 supra.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976 & Supp. 1979). See generally 54 AM. JUR 2d
Monopolies § § 198-205. Accord, TXI/Pan-Am-National Judge Decision at 40, and
Eastern-National Judge Decision at 21.
105. 49 U.S.C. § § 1301-1504 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
106. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 40-45. Pan Am, TXI and the
Department of Justice all took the position that if the proposed acquisitions or mergers
passed both the Clayton Act Test and the Sherman Act Test, that there was no need to
subject them to the public interest tests. The factors listed in section 12(a) of the Bank
Merger Act would only come into play if the antitrust tests are not passed. National
and others contend that even if the proposed mergers pass the antitrust tests, they
could still be disapproved if they fail to pass the public interest test. Id. It would ap-
pear that the first position is supported by the Legislative History, which states: "These
latter tests (public interest tests) only apply if a merger or similar transaction does not
meet the Sherman and Clayton Act Standards." A.D.A. Legislative History, supra
note 14, at 3789 (emphasis added).
107. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 40-45.
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whose Texas International/Pan Am-National decision provided the
first interpretation of Section 408, concluded that antitrust analysis was
only an important part of the overall public interest standard, and that
the factors for public interest listed in Section 102(a) of the A.D.A.
should be considered, but were not exhaustive. 10 8 Specifically:
The analysis proceeds as follows: a determination is made concern-
ing whether a proposed merger is anticompetitive or not (The Clay-
ton Act Test). If the conclusion is that the transaction is not an-
ticompetitive then other public interest factors are evaluated. The
antitrust and other public interest factors are then weighed and
balanced against each other and an ultimate determination is
made. Thus, the merger may pass muster under antitrust criteria
but offend overriding public interest considerations on the other
hand. In that event the merger must be disapproved. Finally, if the
merger fails under the antitrust criteria it may still be approved
pursuant to section 408(b)(1)(B) if it meets significant transporta-
tion needs.109
Applying this analysis, Judge Dapper concluded with respect to
each airline that the proposed transactions were violative of the Clay-
ton Act test;110 applying the public interest test as applied under the
Bank Merger Act of 1966, he concluded that neither airline had met
its burden of proof in establishing that such a merger would meet "sig-
nificant transportation conveniences and needs of the public."",1
108. Id. at 43.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 82-91.
111. Id. at 114-127. TXI's principal argument was that it was a more aggressive
and better-managed company than National, that subsequent to the merger TXI's low
cost fares could be introduced system-wide and overall management would be improved
to the benefit of the consumer. Judge Dapper declined to accept this thesis. He also
noted several negative factors that he considered: 1) a long period of cross-ownership
would have detrimental effects on National; 2) TXI might lose its citizenship because
of the foreign debenture device it used to raise money for the acquisition; 3) approval
of this acquisition would be a signal that might cause other acquisitions or mergers; 4)
it would be better for the consumer if TXI expanded internally rather than acquired
another airline externally and 5) TXI violated section 408 when it initially acquired
more than 10% of National stock without Board approval. Id. at 82-91. Likewise,
Judge Dapper disagreed with Pan Am's main contention that it would be in the public
interest to permit Pan Am to rapidly acquire a domestic feeder system and thereby
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/3
Airline Deregulation & Merger1 6:1981
Several months later, Judge Murphy in the Eastern-National case
determined that there were three separate tests to be considered under
the A.D.A.: 1) the public interest test, 2) the Sherman Act Test and 3)
the Clayton Act Test." 2 He concluded that each of the three tests must
be passed for approval, rather than the alternative propositions Judge
Dapper considered. Thus, even though he concluded that the proposed
acquisition would "not be inconsistent with the public interest," 113 and
that it would pass the Sherman Act Test,1 4 because it failed the Clay-
ton Act Test, he recommended disapproval.1 15
C.A.B. Decision in the Texas International/Pan Am-National
Merger Application
In October 1979 the full C.A.B. interpreted for the first time the
applicability and interrelationship of the various tests under Section
408 of the A.D.A. First the Board decided that the public interest stan-
dard was separate and independent from the antitrust standard. How-
ever the Board refused to read subsection 7, condemning monopolies
and other anticompetitive acts, out of the public interest factors of sec-
tion 102(a). Despite including antitrust or anticompetitive factors in
the public interest test, the Board noted that the effect would be the
same as pre-A.D.A. analysis using the Clayton Act Test and the Bank
Merger Act of 1966, since the Clayton Act envisaged a broad inquiry,
subsuming this independent public interest inquiry.11 6 In making a de-
termination under the Clayton Act, the Board decided that a "func-
tional analysis" of the acquisitions, taking into account the "structure,
history and performance of the industry," was more appropriate than
"static statistical analyses of market shares and concentration ra-
support its position as the primary U.S. flag carrier, rather than require it to slowly
build such a domestic feeder system. The Judge also listed three negative public inter-
est factors: 1) the merger would be inconsistent with U.S. international aviation policy
which supports more international competition, 2) internal growth is preferable and 3)
approval would trigger other mergers. Id. at 114-127.
112. Eastern-National Judge Decision at 5-6, 12.
113. Id. at 21.
114. Id. at 59.
115. Id. at 62.
116. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 58-60.
I
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tios. '1 1 The Board ultimately disagreed with Judge Dapper, determin-
ing that there were no anticompetitive problems with either merger or
acquisition, other than on the United States-London market, 118 and
further found that both applications were in the public interest, subject
to labor protective provisions.119
In the Board's functional Clayton Act analysis, it agreed with
Judge Dapper that the "product market" was "scheduled air transpor-
tation." 120 Actually Judge Dapper had more narrowly defined the ap-
plicable product market as "scheduled passenger air transportation be-
tween a specific origin point and a specific destination point."1 21,
Looking first at the Texas International proposal, Judge Dapper
determined the applicable geographic markets were those city-pairs
where Texas International and National actually competed, those
where one of the two airlines actually operated and the other might be
a potential entrant and those where both airlines might be potential
entrants. 22 Although the Board agreed that city-pairs deserved analy-
sis, it deemphasized the importance of statistical market share analysis
relative to such city-pairs. It based its Clayton Act determination upon
a historical, structural and prospective analysis of the industry, particu-
larly in view of deregulation. 23 Specifically, Judge Dapper determined
117. Id. at 6 and 59.
118. Id. at 3-7. See text accompanying note 138 infra.
119. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 3-7.
120. Id. at 10.
121. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 52-55 citing Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Judge Dapper stated, "In that proceeding, the
Court stated that the key factor in identifying the product market was the 'reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross elasticity of demand between the product itself
and substitutes for it." TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 53. It would appear
that the difference in terminology between Judge Dapper and the Board shows the
Board's emphasis upon a more functional analysis, partially occasioned by the changed
competitive conditions brought about by the A.D.A.
122. Id. at 57.
123. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 12-16, citing United States v. General Dy-
namics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
We believe the Judge erred in not accepting TXI's invitation to make a
thorough examination of this market .... Under this functional ap-
proach the likely effect on performance should be examined as well as sur-
face structural changes .... We believe that we should apply antitrust
law functionally and in the light of the recent and ongoing deregulation of
26
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there would be a substantial and continuing two-firm concentration ra-
tio in the Houston-New Orleans market should the proposed merger be
approved, which would violate the Clayton Act. 2  Skeptical about
market shares analysis in general, the Board decided Texas Interna-
tional's rapid market growth and Southwest Airlines' ability to enter
the market with apparent ease belied the conclusions drawn by Judge
Dapper.1 25 The Board concluded that the loss of National in this mar-
ket would not be anticompetitive. 2 '
Courts have divided potential competition into "perceived" and
"actual" potential competition.127 Judge Dapper examined sixteen city-
pairs radiating from Houston or New Orleans and determined that ei-
ther National or TXI would be an actual potential competitor, having
deconcentrating effects upon the markets they entered. 128 Disagreeing
with this conclusion, the Board noted the Judge's underlying assump-
tion, that "concentration gives rise to poor competitive performance," is
legally challengeable.129 Concluding that none of these southern tier
markets faced any anticompetitive challenge from the proposed acquisi-
tion, the Board decided that no commercial (or special) barriers would
prevent other airlines from entering these markets, should the acquisi-
tion be approved.'30 It emphasized the changed conditions under the
A.D.A.:
the airline industry. The case law just reviewed reveals a reemphasis of the
Supreme Court's belief that a thorough review of competitive circum-
stances is advisable.
TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 16.
124. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 62-70.
125. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 17-19.
126. Id. at 19.
127. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 71:
An actual entrant is a company which does not serve the relevant market.
However, it has the 'available feasible means' for entering the relevant
market other than by acquisition; and those means offer a 'substantial like-
lihood of producing deconcentration in that market or other significant
procompetitive effects.' A perceived potential entrant is a company which
does not serve the relevant market. However, it is perceived by the compet-
itors in the relevant market as likely to enter that market if anticompeti-
tive practices develop.
128. Id. at 75-80.
129. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 23.
130. Id. at 20-31.
63 1
27
Stinson: The Pan American World Airways-National Airlines  Merger and The
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
A more general examination of entry conditions must begin with
the recognition that the most significant barrier to competitive en-
try in the domestic system was a regime of restrictive licensing and
that has been eliminated by the passage of the A.D.A. In imple-
menting its provisions we have adopted a policy of granting wide-
spread authority to all fit applicants, and of allowing substantial
freedom to reduce fares and engage in price competition." 1
In considering the Pan Am application, the administrative law
judge chose five city-pairs where National was actually operating and
where Pan Am was an actual potential competitor. He concluded,
based upon the high concentration ratios and the competitive effect Pan
Am's entry into these markets would have, the proposed merger would
violate the Clayton Act in all such markets.3 2 Rejecting his recommen-
dation, the Board again decided it was necessary to go beyond market
share and concentration ratios, and determined all five markets were
substantial markets that would draw other capable competitors should
the merger be approved. 33
Internationally, city-pairs are not as important because consumers
are more price sensitive and less time sensitive, willing to substitute
destinations and origins when economically advantageous. The airline
industry and C.A.B. have recognized this unique situation. Thus both
Judge Dapper and the Board concluded, with respect to the Pan Amer-
ican-National merger, that the United States-Western Europe market
should be the applicable international market, with United States-
London as a sub-market.l&4
With respect to the United States-Western Europe market, Judge
Dapper determined that National and Pan Am were actual competitors
in a concentrated market, that National had become the third largest
United States carrier crossing the Atlantic and moreover, was a vigor-
ous competitor; therefore, its loss under the contemplated merger would
be anticompetitive and violative of the Clayton Act.135 The Board, on
the other hand disagreed that National had been a vigorous competitor
131. Id. at 27.
132. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 110-114.
133. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 55-57.
134. Id. at 32-34, 44-46, and TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 94-101.
135. TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 104-109.
64 Nova Law Journal
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and disagreed that the merger would have any effect on a healthy and
increasingly competitive transatlantic market.1 36 Further the Board
noted:
Competitive conditions in the United States-Western Europe mar-
ket have changed markedly in recent months, and we believe that
as a result the reduction by one of the number of United States
scheduled carriers will have little impact on competition. Over the
past few years the United States government has promoted and en-
couraged liberalized entry in international aviation. The results of
this effort are now being seen in the form of bilateral agreements
with some European nations which permit United States carriers,
unrestricted in number, to fly to virtually any major point (city) in
those nations.1317
The Board agreed with Judge Dapper's analysis of the United
States-London submarket. Transferring National's Miami-London cer-
tificate would increase the Pan American market share and would be
anticompetitive. Rather then veto the merger as the Judge recom-
mended, the Board conditioned approval on the loss of the Miami-
London route, making that route subject to separate route
proceedings. 3 8
Since the Board disagreed with the Judge on the public interest
test, it approved both the Texas International and the Pan American
applications.1 39 Before the A.D.A. such approval would automatically
clothe the acquisition or merger with antitrust immunity. But the
Board noted congressional policy had changed under the A.D.A. Im-
munity must now be specifically conferred by the Board, if the Board
determines under section 414 of the A.D.A. that immunity is required
136. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 35-43.
137. Id. at 37. This decision was written before I.A.T.C.A. became law; this has
further increased competition on the Transatlantic routes.
138. Id. at 44-54 and TXI/Pan Am-National Judge Decision at 109-110. Even-
tually the Board was forced to return the route permanently to the new Pan Am, be-
cause it was the only U.S. carrier that could continue to fly into Heathrow under the
terms of amendments to the Bermuda II Treaty, imposed by the British. Russell,
London Run Is Pan Am's: CAB Cities Heathrow Flap, Miami Herald, Apr. 8, 1980,
§ A, at 1, col. 3.
139. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 3-7.
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in the public interest. Additionally, the Board required the applicants
to show the merger would not go forward without such immunity.
Neither applicant made the showing; therefore, the Board declined to
grant antitrust immunity.140 Without such immunity it is conceivable
that the merger may be subject to collateral attacks by the Government
or other airlines, which could subject the resulting airline to treble
damages and other penalties."4
Despite arguments that labor protective provisions were not justi-
fied under the philosophy of the A.D.A., the Board nevertheless condi-
tioned its approval on acceptance of the standard labor protective
provisions first enunciated in the Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case.142
Other Post-A.D.A. Decisions
No formal C.A.B. opinion was prepared in the Eastern-National
merger case, because Eastern dropped out of competition after receiv-
ing the initial unfavorable Board opinion.1 43 It is useful nevertheless to
compare briefly the administrative law judge's initial decision in East-
ern with the Board decision in the TXI/Pan Am-National Merger.
Noting the vigorous actual competition between Eastern and National
on the East Coast and Sun Belt Routes, Judge Murphy concluded the
applicable geographical markets for the Clayton Act test were groups
of routes (rather than city-pairs). 4 He placed much emphasis on mar-
ket share and firm concentration ratios; and, despite misgivings en-
genderred by General Dynamics, concluded those statistics, though
generated prior to the A.D.A., proved the merger would be anticompe-
140. Id. at 73-77.
141. See generally Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation,
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 1001 (1980).
142. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 65-69. See text accompanying notes 168-
69 infra.
143. Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Con-
trol of National Airlines, Inc., Docket No. 34226, CAB Order No. 79-12-74 (Dec. 17,
1979) (dismissing the application).
144. Eastern-National Judge Decision at 22-32. The routes were: 1) New York-
Florida Routes, 2) Washington-Florida Routes, 3) Intra-Florida Routes, 4) New York-
Washington Routes and 5) Sun Belt Routes. With very little discussion, the Judge
accepted the relevant product market as "scheduled passenger air transportation." Id.
at 22.
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titive.145 After examining the effects of various barriers on potential
competitors, it was his opinion that such barriers precluded entry by
other airlines in four of the five markets; therefore, Eastern had failed
to rebut the merger opponents' prima facie case.148 Thus the proposed
merger failed the Clayton Act test. Therefore even though it passed the
Sherman Act test and the Public Interest test, Judge Murphy recom-
mended disapproval. 47
Both administrative law judges premised their decisions on tradi-
tional, historically-slanted market share analysis. They were less in-
clined to include the effects of the A.D.A.'s deregulatory philosophy.
The Texas International/Pan Am-National Board decision, which
came several months later, more willingly predicted the market and
competitive effects of the year-old A.D.A.
Continental Airlines and Western Airlines have twice submitted
joint applications for approval of proposed mergers. Even though the
administrative law judge in the first application recommended ap-
proval, the full Board voted to disapprove.1 48 It filed no formal opinion
because the Continental Board of Directors withdrew from the merger
agreement. In the Order Dismissing Application, the Board indicated
the proposed merger would fail the Clayton Act test, since both airlines
were aggressive actual competitors in at least twelve city-pairs and po-
tential competitors in many other western cities.149 Further, the Board
expressed concern about barriers caused by crowded conditions at some
Western United States airports which would bar potential competitors
even in a deregulated situation.1 50 Another factor was the possibility of
145. Id. at 33-36 citing United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486
(1974).
146. Id. at 37-51. While there were no regulatory barriers, and temporary but
not insurmountable capital barriers, there were landing slot restrictions at some East-
ern U.S. airports that might constitute barriers, and similar but less serious gate
problems in Florida. Fuel sources were not a problem. But route efficiency and the
marketability of the alternatives might constitute barriers in certain markets. Cumula-
tively there would be problems of entry in all but perhaps the Sun Belt market and
therefore Eastern had not rebutted the prima facie case against it. Id.
147. Id. at 62.
148. See First Continental-Western Order.
149. Id. at 1.
150. Id. at 2.
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duopolistic control by the new airline and United Airlines.151 The
Board did not accept some of the asserted public benefits,152 and thus
disapproved the application.
In instituting proceedings on the second case, the Board asked the
parties and the administrative law judge to specifically address those
concerns it voiced over the first application and to relate them to the
forseeable effects of the A.D.A. 53 Judge Vittone addressed five issues.
First, evidence clearly showed competition in the airline industry na-
tionwide was increasing. 5 Second, since the implementation of new
routes under the A.D.A., competition between the two airlines had sub-
stantially declined.1 55 But third, in those two city-pairs where the
merger would cause decline in competition, there were sufficient poten-
tial competitors.1 58 With respect to concentration Judge Vittone wrote:
Similarly I have concluded that the loss of one of the applicants
upon the merger will not adversely affect the balance of perceived
potential competition in the west. The structure of the air transpor-
tation industry has changed significantly since deregulation and the
Western United States has been the scene of many such changes.
Carriers traditionally confined to the east have entered western
routes since deregulation. Mergers have strengthened the networks
of formerly limited western carriers. . . . Concentration in the
west is declining.157
Fourth, significant improvements had taken place to remove those bar-
riers previously a problem . 58 Finally he determined that the resultant
carrier and United would not be able to exert duopolistic control in
light of deregulation.159 Judge Vittone also extensively examined the
151. Id.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Continental-Western Judge Decision at 1.
154. Id. at 9.
155. Id. at 9-11. Of the twelve original city-pairs where the two airlines were
actual competitors, only four remained that were still served by both. One new city-
pair had been added.
156. Id. at 12-19, 25.
157. Id. at 25.
158. Id. at 27-36.
159. Id. at 37-43.
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relevant product markets."1 0 He finally concluded the proposed merger
would pass all three A.D.A. merger tests.161 The Board adopted his
decisions as its own.162
The Board's three decisions are best viewed and explained in light
of geographic markets served by the various airlines involved in the
mergers at the time the A.D.A. was passed. On the east coast there
was National, Eastern and Delta; an Eastern-National merger would
result in a duopoly between the resultant airline and Delta. In the vast
western United States there was Continental, Western and United; a
Continental-Western merger would result in a duopoly between the re-
sultant airline and United.
But Texas International was largely a Texas-Mexico-southwestern
United States local service carrier and Pan American was strictly an
international carrier, while National was a small trunk line with some
east coast, sun belt and transatlantic traffic. Its merger with either of
the latter applicants would not result in the same potentially duopolistic
market that the first Continental-Western merger or the Eastern-Na-
tional merger would have caused. In the few years since the A.D.A.,
this potential for duopolistic control in a regional market has generally
disappeared because of the liberalized route application proceedings. 1 8
Labor Issues
As previously mentioned, the A.D.A. established a ten year protec-
tion program to assist employees adversely affected by deregulation.
Monthly payments for up to 72 months, relocation assistance and prior-
ity in hiring at any certificated airline, after that airline's furloughed
employees have been called back, are the three major provisions. 1"
Nonetheless the Board prescribed labor protective provisions in the
TXI/Pan National merger as a condition for merger approval.165 The
Board put all interested parties on notice that while special provisions
would not be automatic in future mergers, until unions and labor con-
160. Id. at 44-75.
161. Id. at 87.
162. Second Continental-Western Order.
163. 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
164. 49 U.S.C. § 1552 (Supp. III 1979).
165. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at 65-69 and Appendix III-Labor Protective
Provisions.
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tracts had an opportunity to adjust to the A.D.A., provisions would be
applied as they had since 1950.166 These provisions provide for the inte-
gration of seniority lists in a fair and equitable manner; the payment of
displacement allowances or differential pay for a three year period, if
an employee is adversely affected by the merger; a dismissal allowance
equal to 60% of the average monthly compensation of the employee for
anywhere from six to sixty months, depending on total length of service
and relocation assistance for employees forced to move because of the
merger.1 67
The Pan American-National merger caused many labor problems
based on the different nature of the two airlines and on the different
types of airplanes being used. Labor problems prevented management
from using and mixing equipment in the most advantageous manner.6 8
Eventually an arbitrator had to decide the integration method for pilots
and flight engineers using a complex formula.'69
In the second Continental-Western case, the administrative law
judge found that even two years after the adoption of the A.D.A. most
of the eleven labor agreements binding the applicants had been con-
cluded or substantially delineated prior to the Board's National-Pan
Am decision.17 0 Thus the "notice" given in that decision did not pre-
pare the parties for a merger free of labor protective provisions. The
judge recommended provisions similar to those in the National-Pan Am
166. Id.
167. TXI/Pan Am-National Order at Appendix III-Labor Protective Provisions.
168. See, e.g., Feazel, Labor Problems in Merger May Lead to Arbitration, Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 21, 1980, at 26; Meshing Problems for Pan Am and
National, Bus. WK., Jan. 21, 1980, at 56; Union Issues Big Problem Facing Pan Am
in National Merger, Aviation Daily, Apr. 15, 1980, at 249 and Teamsters Outline
Problems in Pan Am-National Merger, Aviation Daily, Apr. 16, 1980, at 261.
169. In Re: Merger of Pan Am and National Airlines Flight Deck Crew Mem-
ber Seniority Lists, (Arbitrator Lewis M. Gill, Mar. 12, 1981) and In Re: Merger of
Flight Deck Crew Member Seniority Lists. Pan Am and National Airlines, (Arbitrator
Lewis M. Gill, May 5, 1981). Possibly inspired by a similar attempt by Continental
employees to purchase a controlling interest of their airline's stock and thereby pre-
clude a takeover attempt by Texas International, a group of Pan American employees
unsuccessfully tried a similar approach with Pan American in an effort to install their
own management. See Continental's Crusade to Stop Frank Lorenzo, Bus. WK., May
11, 1981, at 110; Merzer, Group Seeks a Takeover of Pan Am, Miami Herald, May
21, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6.
170. Continental Western Judge Decision at 81.
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decision.171 The Board agreed with this analysis, and adopted the labor
protective provisions in its order.17 2
A clearer picture of the future of these provisions was to have been
supplied by the Texas International-Continental Acquisition Case, 73
where Texas International voiced opposition to the provisions. The
C.A.B. instituted a proceeding to consider the costs and benefits of the
provisions.174 On the fourth day of the hearing, however, Texas Inter-
national withdrew its opposition, citing conditions similar to those in
the Continental-Western case.175 Thus, since no evidence against the
provisions would be presented, the judge recommended ending the
hearings as useless.1' He noted that the Board wished to stop using the
provisions, but concluded that this was not the proper case for such a
decision. 7
Conclusion
The Texas International/Pan Am-National Merger Case first in-
terpreted the parameters of airline merger under the A.D.A. While the
administrative law judges tended to use traditional analytical tools in
their decisions, the C.A.B. took a broader view. Recognizing that the
A.D.A. was meant to change the traditional patterns of growth in com-
mercial aviation, the Board rejected only those mergers that would pro-
duce a duopoly of control in an area. As deregulation proceeds, compe-
tition should increase in all areas of the country, with the possibility of
duopolistic control lessening everywhere. Perhaps the last years of
C.A.B. control will approach the "decontrol" the A.D.A. aspires to.
The limits to merger will be the pressures of economy, often difficult to
predict. As in the Pan Am-National merger, an unsuccessful merger
attempt may be more financially rewarding than a completed one. Only
time will tell if Pan Am was the winner in its endeavors.
171. Id. at 82.
172. Second Continental-Western Order at 16 and Appendix B.
173. C.A.B. Docket No. 39285 (1981).
174. Texas International-Continental Acquisition Case, Docket No. 39285,
C.A.B. Order 81-3-100 (Jan. 3, 1981).
175. Texas International-Continental Acquisition Case, Docket No. 39285, at 2
(Partial Decision of Judge Kane, Jr., May 22, 1981).
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id. at 4-5.
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Appendix A
The following abbreviated citation form is used: A.W. = Aviation
Week & Space Technology; B.W. = Business Week; M.H. = Miami
Herald; N.Y.T. = New York Times; W.S.J. = Wall Street Journal.
7/10/78 TXI announces it bought 790,700 shares of NAL's 8.6 mil-
lion shares of common stock between June 12, 1978, and
July 7, 1978, for $14,355,780.45 including brokers' commis-
sions. It is considering the possibility of seeking control.
N.Y.T., July 11, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 1, W.S.J., July 11,
1978, at 2, col. 2; A.W., July 17, 1978, at 28.
7/28/78 TXI files with C.A.B. to seek control of NAL. Also notifies
S.E.C. of intent to buy not more than 25% of NAL common
stock. Stock to go in voting trust. C.A.B. Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection notifies TXI that such purchases would be
a "knowing and willful" violation of Federal Aviation Act.
TXI has no definite plans for the acquisition. N.Y.T., July
29, 1978, § A, at 23, col. 3; W.S.J., July 31, 1978, at 3, col.
4.
8/8/78 NAL asks C.A.B. to delay approving TXI request to
purchase more NAL stock and also asks that TXI be forced
to detail its takeover plan. N.Y.T., Aug. 9, 1978, § D, at 1,
col. 6; W.S.J., Aug. 9, 1978, at 11, col. 3.
8/16/78 TXI's Netherlands Antilles financing subsidiary announces
offering of $25 million convertible subordinated debentures
paying 72% convertible into TXI common stock at the rate
of one share per $14.50 of debentures. Proceeds will be used
to buy additional NAL stock. W.S.J., Aug. 8, 1978, at 35,
col. 2; W.S.J., Aug. 17, 1978, at 29, col. 1.
8/22/78 Pan Am files application with C.A.B. for permission to
merge with NAL. Announces that it has acquired 411,600
shares or 4.8% of NAL's stock. Offers $35/share or approxi-
mately $286 million for acquisition. Pan Am also asks that
it be allowed to purchase up to 25% of NAL stock. A.W.,
Aug. 28, 1978, at 30; W.S.J., Aug. 24, 1978, at 3, col. 1;
W.S.J., Aug. 25, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
8/25/78 C.A.B. enters order tentatively allowing TXI to purchase up
to 25% of NAL common stock. Requires that all stock in
excess of 10% be placed in a voting trust device, with stock
172 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
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to be voted in same proportion as all non-TXI held NAL
stock. Recommends that all such stock be placed in voting
trust. Thirty days for comments before order is confirmed.
TXI-NAL Acquisition Case & Enforcement Investigation,
Docket No. 33112, Order 78-8-150 (Aug. 25, 1978); see
also W.S.J., Aug. 18, 1978, at 6, col. 4.
8/28/78 C.A.B. permits Pan Am to purchase up to 25% of NAL
common stock on same conditions as TXI. TXI case as-
signed to administrative law judge. N.Y.T. Supp. Mat.,
Aug. 29, 1978, at 12; W.S.J., Aug. 29, 1978, at 4, 1.
8/29/78 TXI has purchased 1,553,300 shares or approximately
18.2% of NAL stock for a total acquisition cost of
$42,193,501. TXI also announces foreign debenture sale
completed. A.W., Sept. 4, 1978, at 36; W.S.J., Aug. 31,
1978, at 27, col. 4.
9/5/78 U.S. Justice Department announces its intent to intervene
and files Petition for Intervention with the C.A.B. W.S.J.,
Sept. 5, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
9/6/78 Directors of Pan Am and NAL hold merger discussions in
Miami, Florida. W.S.J., Sept. 6, 1978, at 2, col. 2; W.S.J.,
Sept. 7, 1978, at 5, col. 5.
9/7/78 C.A.B. consolidates TXI and Pan Am merger cases. Pan
Am announces that it has a definitive merger agreement
with NAL whereby Pan Am would purchase NAL for $41/
share or about $350 million and would rename NAL Pan
American U.S.A. W.S.J., Sept. 8, 1978, at 6, col. 4; TXI-
NAL Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket
Nos. 33112 and 32283, Order Consolidating Cases 78-9-24
(Sept. 7, 1978).
9/11/78 TXI announces it has bought an additional 165,000 shares
at a price per share of $34.08. TXI has 1,718,300 shares at
a total cost of $48,816,076.45 or $28.41 per share. W.S.J.,
Sept. 11, 1978, at 12, col. 3.
9/14/78 TXI petitions C.A.B. to permit it to acquire control of
NAL. Eventually TXI expects a complete amalgamation of
the two carriers, but has no specific plans at present. W.S.J.,
Sept. 15, 1978, at 38, col. 5.
9/15/78 U.S. Justice Department urges C.A.B. to prohibit further
purchases of NAL stock by either Pan Am or TXI. Pan
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Am discloses details of the Pan Am-NAL merger
agreement and that it has lined up $300 million of the
$350 million credit needed for the purchase. Pan Am also
has acquired 1,614,000 shares of NAL stock or 18.9% for a
total purchase price of $55,406,297. A.W., Sept. 25, 1978,
at 21-22; W.S.J., Sept. 18, 1978, at 10, col. 2; W.S.J.,
Sept. 19, 1978, at 34, col. 2.
9/25/78 TXI asked by NAL if it expects to make an offer better
than Pan Am's. W.S.J., Sept. 26, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
9/29/78 Frank Borman, EAL President, states that EAL would
have to seek merger if either Pan Am or TXI are permitted
to merge with NAL. EAL urges C.A.B. to disapprove both
mergers. A.W., Oct. 2, 1978, at 33.
10/16/78 Pan Am files documentation with C.A.B. B.W., Nov. 6,
1978, at 67.
10/20/78 C.A.B. approves continued use of voting trusts by TXI and
Pan Am. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition
Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, Order 78-10-100 (Oct.
20, 1978).
10/24/78 President Carter signs the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, PUB. L. No. 95-504, 92 STAT. 1705 (amending 49
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.); W.S.J., Oct. 25, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
10/31/78 Hearing before Judge Dapper begins and lasts until Janu-
ary 12, 1979. Exhibits and transcripts total over 12,000
pages. Opening briefs filed by 25 organizations. TXI-NAL
Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos.
33112 & 33283, Decision at 5 & 7 (Apr. 5, 1978).
11/3/78 TXI purchases 76,500 more shares of stock at $22.34/
share for a total holding of 1,969,000 shares, or $54.5 mil-
lion. TXI has acquired 23% of NAL at a per share average
of $27.45. A.W., Nov. 6, 1978, at 34.
12/11/78 EAL announces that it too will seek approval to merge
with NAL. EAL offers $50/share or $425 million for
NAL. Criticized as a defensive move. Financing may be
difficult because of a high debt-equity ratio. A.W., Dec. 18,
1978, at 29; B.W., Dec. 25, 1978, at 35; N.Y.T., Dec. 12,
1978, § D at 1, col. 6; W.S.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
12/13/78 EAL files application for merger approval with C.A.B. and
requests that case be consolidated with the other two NAL
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merger cases. EAL Acquisition Case, Docket No. 34226,
Decision at 1 (June 14, 1979).
12/15/78 NAL management unsure what it will recommend to its
stockholders relative to the EAL merger attempt. Before
EAL offer, NAL planned to recommend the lower Pan Am
offer. W.S.J., Dec. 18, 1978, at 17, col. 1.
12/21/78 Despite contrary recommendation by Judge Dapper,
C.A.B. denies EAL Petition to Consolidate all NAL
merger cases. W.S.J., Dec. 22, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
12/22/78 S.E.C. investigation into adequacy of TXI's and Pan Am's
public disclosures reported. EAL not affected. N.Y.T.,
Dec. 23, 1978, § 1, at 29, col. 5; W.S.J., Dec. 26, 1978, at
7, col. 1.
12/29/78 EAL announces that Chase Manhattan Bank has agreed to
provide $100 million of $425 million purchase price.
W.S.J., Jan. 1, 1979, at 19, col. 4.
1/22/79 U.S. Department of Justice files brief with C.A.B. opposing
both TXI and Pan Am merger proposal on antitrust
grounds. D.O.J. argues such mergers would have anticom-
petitive effects and would violate standards set by the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978. U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, on the other hand, files briefs supporting both
airlines. W.S.J., Jan. 23, 1979, at 48, col. 1.
1/25/79 Pan Am proposes amendment to its offer which would al-
low bidding between EAL and Pan Am if they receive final
approval to merge with NAL. N.Y.T., Jan. 27, 1979, § 1,
at 29, col. 4; W.S.J., Jan. 29, 1979, at 18, col. 2.
2/8/79 NAL announces auction plan whereby Pan Am and EAL
would have five rounds of bids in a 48 hour period with
Pan Am always getting the final bid. EAL states that it is
willing to forego C.A.B. antitrust immunity to expedite its
merger effort with NAL. N.Y.T., Feb. 9, 1979, § D, at 5,
col. 1; W.S.J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 2, col. 3.
2/20/79 TXI makes formal bid to NAL of consideration that would
be worth at least $50/share composed of cash, debt securi-
ties, equity securities or a combination. W.S.J., Feb. 20,
1979, at 4, col. 2.
2/21/79 Air Florida asks C.A.B. approval to purchase NAL inter-
national routes and four of its DC-10 series 30 airplanes at
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same price that the purchaser of domestic route pays. Air
Florida urges that Pan Am be given domestic route and
Air Florida be given the international route. W.S.J., Feb.
22, 1979, at 29, col. 1.
3/9/79 NAL rejects TXI offer and says that after merger NAL
shares would not be worth $50 each because of TXI financ-
ing arrangements. W.S.J., Mar. 12, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
4/5/79 Administrative Law Judge Dapper files opinion in which he
finds that the application of TXI to merge with NAL
should be denied, further finds that TXI has violated 49
U.S.C. § 1378 by acquiring control of NAL without prior
C.A.B. approval and finally recommends that Pan Am's
application also be denied. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/
Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283,
Decision (Apr. 5, 1978); see also W.S.J., Apr. 6, 1979, at
7, col. 3.
4/25/79 NAL tells shareholders in supplementary proxy material
that they, in effect, would be loaning TXI the money with
which to buy NAL. Both the U.S. Departments of Justice
and Transportation tell the C.A.B. they oppose the acquisi-
tion bid of EAL because it would reduce competition.
W.S.J., Apr. 26, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
5/2/79 Pan Am formally raises its merger offer to $50/share.
M.H., May 3, 1979, § C, at 7, col. 3.
5/16/79 NAL shareholders approve Pan Am's revised merger offer
at annual meeting. They also approve the management rec-
ommended auction plan which would give Pan Am the
final bid should the C.A.B. approve Pan Am and EAL
merger. TXI merger offer is rejected. Palm Beach Post,
May 17, 1979, § C, at 5, col. 3.
6/14/79 Administrative Law Judge Murphy finds that the EAL ap-
plication for merger with NAL should be denied because it
would substantially lessen competition. EAL Acquisition
Case, Docket No. 34226, Decision (June 14, 1979). See
also M.H., June 15, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 5.
7/10/79 C.A.B. unanimously enters a preliminary order instructing
its staff to prepare a final order permitting both TXI's ap-
plication to acquire and Pan Am's application to merge.
Preliminarily the Board finds that neither application is in-
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consistent with the public interest or anticompetitive under
the standards prescribed by 49 U.S.C. § 1378. Further the
C.A.B. lifts its 25% limits on the purchase of stock by both
carriers because it does not want to preclude either carrier
from purchasing the NAL stock at its present, possibly
lower price. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisi-
tion Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, Order (July 10,
1979); M.H., July 11, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 5.
7/21/79 C.A.B. turns down Continental-Western merger proposal
despite recommendation of administrative law judge. Many
on Wall Street see this as signal that the Eastern proposal
will also be rejected because of similar anticompetitive fac-
tors. M.H., July 24, 1979, § C, at 4, col. 1; M.H., July 25,
1979, § A, at 12, col. 2; A.W., July 30, 1979, at 22.
7/23/79 Pan Am announces that it has bought 95,000 shares of Na-
tional the preceding week and 900,000 shares today for to-
tal holdings of 3.1 million shares or 36% of NAL stock.
M.H., July 24, 1979, § C, at 4, col. 5.
7/24/79 NAL's stock topped the N.Y.S.E. active list with
1,191,400 shares traded. Pan Am confirmed it was buying,
but refused to reveal numbers. Nine large blocks of stock
totaling 911,400 shares were sold today and assumption is
Pan Am was the buyer. If true then Pan Am had at least 4
million shares of National or roughly 47% of the total
stock. M.H., July 25, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 2.
7/26/79 Pan Am publicly acknowledges that it is the majority
shareholder in NAL, having purchased 4,398,500 shares in
all for a total purchase price of about $186 million or a per
share average price of $42.25. Eastern owns only about 100
token shares. Speculation is that TXI would make about
$45 million for its shares. M.H., July 27, 1979, § A, at 1,
col. 6.
7/29/79 Pan Am and TXI announce Pan Am will buy NAL stock
owned by TXI for 3 million dollars plus $50 per share.
TXI will realize pre-tax profit of $45,780,000 on the sale of
2.9 million shares and Pan Am will own 75.9% of NAL.
Palm Beach Post Times, July 29, 1979, § A, at 24, col. 1.
7/30/79 TXI President Lorenzo informs C.A.B. by letter that TXI
will sell stock to Pan Am. TXI-NAL Acquisition Case/Pan
77 I1
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Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos. 33112 & 33283, Deci-
sion 79-12-163; 79-12-164; 79-12-165 at 61 (Oct. 24,
1979).
8/10/79 NAL announces fiscal year profit of $24.22 million or
$2.83 per share. Palm Beach Post Times, Aug. 11, 1979, §
A, at 19, col. 5.
9/13/79 N.Y.S.E. halts trading in T.W. Corporation (T.W.A. par-
ent company) stock. Trading rapid because of TXI attempt
to acquire T.W.A. through purchase of 1.6 million shares.
TXI attempt rebuffed by T.W. Corporation. A.W., Sept.
19, 1979, at 26; N.Y.T., Oct. 29, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 3.
9/27/79 Informal C.A.B. decision disapproves Eastern merger bid
with National. Anticompetitive effects cited. A.W., Oct. 1,
1979, at 23.
10/5/79 Eastern announces it will-halt its pursuit of NAL in view
of the C.A.B. decision. A.W., Oct. 8, 1979, at 29.
10/24/79 Formal 77 page C.A.B. decision issued approving both
Texas International and Pan Am merger applications and
setting out the detailed rationale of the Board. TXI-NAL
Acquisition Case/Pan Am Acquisition Case, Docket Nos.
33112 & 33283, Decision 79-12-163; 79-12-164; 79-12-165
(Oct. 24, 1979); A.W., Nov. 5, 1979, at 32; M.H., Oct. 30,
1979, § A, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.T., Oct. 30, 1979, § A, at 1,
col. 4.
12/7/79 Hearings to begin on London-Miami service proposals.
Eleven airlines, including Pan Am, Eastern and Air Florida
had filed proposals. A.W., Dec. 3, 1979, at 31.
12/22/79 President Carter approves TXI and Pan Am merger pro-
posals. Letter from President Jimmy Carter to C.A.B.
Chairman Marvin Cohen dated December 22, 1979. M.H.,
Dec. 23, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.T., Dec. 23, 1979, §
1, at 12, col. 2.
12/26/79 C.A.B. grants Pan Am exemption for Miami-London route
until permanent route decision made. Pan Am Acquisition
Case, Docket No. 33283, Order 79-12-166 (Dec. 26,
1979).
12/31/79 Pan Am net income for the last full year of operation
before acquiring National was reported as $76.128 million,
which was down from the $118.801 million net income
178 6: 1981 1
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from the year before. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS,
INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1979 at 2 (1980).
1/7/80 Formal acquisition of National by Pan Am. B.W., Jan. 21,
1980, at 56.
1/18/80 National certificates of public convenience and necessity
formally transferred to Pan Am. Pan Am Acquisition
Case, Docket No. 33283, Order 80-1-125 (Jan. 18, 1980).
1/29/80 U.S.-Great Britain bilateral talks begin. Gatwick over
Heathrow is seen as a major issue. A.W., Jan. 21, 1980, at
31.
2/15/80 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979
signed into law by President Carter. Deregulates interna-
tional aviation to extent possible. PUB. L. No. 96-192, 94
Stat. 35 (Feb. 15, 1980).
2/22/80 Administrative Law Judge Elias Rodriguez recommends
Eastern get Miami-London route. M.H., Feb. 23, 1980, §
A, at 1, col. 8.
3/5/80 U.S.-British bilateral agreement initiated. All new London
service, whether British or American, to be through
Gatwick. A.W., Mar. 17, 1980, at 26.
4/3/80 D.O.T. announces it would support legislation for C.A.B.
sunset in 1982 rather than 1985. A.W., Apr. 7, 1980, at
32.
4/7/80 Full C.A.B. gives Pan Am the Miami-London route be-
cause Pan Am was the only route applicant that could con-
tinue to serve Heathrow Airport under bilateral agreement.
A.W., Apr. 14, 1980, at 24; M.H., Apr. 8, 1980, § A, at 1,
col. 8; Palm Beach Post, Apr. 8, 1980, § B, at 9, col. 5.
7/1/80 Pan Am will be unable to meet the deadline for a fully
completed merger because of labor problems caused by
merger. A.W., Apr. 21, 1980, at 26.
7/28/80 Pan Am announces that it had agreed to sell its 59 story
headquarters building in New York City to Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company for a total sales price of $400 mil-
lion. Airline will continue to occupy the 15% of the build-
ing it was using. B.W., Aug. 11, 1980, at 25; TIME, Aug.
11, 1980, at 50.
10/6/80 Pan Am announces that Teamsters unions have reached
agreement as to the integration of seniority lists for certain
79 1
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ground personnel. A.W., Oct. 6, 1980, at 36.
10/26/80 Pan Am and National officially become one completely
merged airline operating solely under the Pan Am name.
A.W., Oct. 6, 1980, at 36; PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIR-
WAYS, INC., 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1981).
12/31/80 Sale of Pan Am building officially recorded, which resulted
in a gain of $294.4 million. The company also showed an
operating loss of $87.819 million, compared to an operat-
ing income of $112.703 million for the previous year. Be-
cause of the gain on the sale of the building, the net in-
come for the year was $80.266 million versus $76.128
million for the previous year. Id. at 27.
3/12/81 Arbitrator Lewis M. Gill issues Award in In Re: Merger of
Pan Am and National Airlines Flight Deck Crew Member
Seniority Lists and thereby resolves the seniority integra-
tion problems. See also A.W., Mar. 2, 1981, at 38.
4/7/81 Pan Am founder and former C.E.O., Juan Trippe dies.
TIME, Apr. 13, 1981, at 81.
5/11/81 Arbitrator Lewis M. Gill issues 59 page Opinion in In Re:
Merger of Flight Deck Crew Member Seniority Lists, Pan
Am and National Airlines, to explain and support his ear-
lier Award.
5/20/81 Former National pilots group announces intent to organize
all Pan Am employees in an effort to buy the controlling
interest in the company. M.H., May 21, 1981, § A, at 1,
col. 1.
6/30/81 Revenue passenger miles for first half of 1981 down 9.1%
over same period in 1980 and Pan Am has a $217.6 million
operating loss for the first six months of 1981 versus a total
1980 operating loss of $126.9 million. A.W., July 20, 1981,
at 27; M.H., Aug. 15, 1981, § A, at 5, col. 1.
7/7/81 William Waltrip appointed President of Pan Am to suc-
ceed William Seawell. Pan Am changes to a holding com-
pany, with three divisions, one of which is the airline.
A.W., July 13, 1981, at 30; M.H., July 8, 1981, § A, at 1,
col. 1; M.H., July 19, 1981, § F, at 1, col. 1.
7/14/81 Pan Am announces 10% reduction in operations and the
reduction of the payroll by 3,000 jobs. Operations in New
York City will only be at J.F.K., rather than there and at
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col. 1; M.H., July 19, 1981, § F, at 1, col. 1.
8/3/81 P.A.T.C.O. strikes and causes disruptions in flight sched-
ules and causes further losses. TIME, August 17, 1981, at
14; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 52.
8/15/81 Miami Herald reports that well placed sources indicated
Pan Am might move its headquarters back to the former
National headquarters at the Miami International Airport
to take advantage of all the unused space that is available
and to further reduce operating expenses. M.H., Aug. 15,
1981, § A, at 1, col. 5.
8/20/81 Earlier this week Pan Am announced that its profitable In-
ter Continental Hotel subsidiary or division is for sale. Di-
rectors are assembled today to allegedly consider approxi-
mately $500 million offer for the 83 hotel chain in 48
countries from Grand Metropolitan Ltd., a giant British li-
quor and hotel company. PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 21,
1981, § D, at 9, col. 4.
8/21/81 Pan Am agrees to sell Inter Continental Hotel Corp., sub-
sidiary to Grand Metropolitan Ltd. of London for $500
million. Sale to be consummated on September 30, 1981.
A.W., Aug. 31, 1981, at 29.
9/1/81 C. Edward Acker, chief executive officer of Air Florida, be-
comes chairman and chief executive officer of Pan Am. Eli
Timoner to replace Acker at Air Florida. A.W., Aug. 31,
1981, at 29.
9/7/81 Pan Am announces 67% unrestricted fare cuts on many do-
mestic routes to increase traffic. A.W., Sept. 14, 1981, at
34.
9/11/81 Pan Am signs formal agreement with syndicate of banks
led by Citibank for a $200 million line of credit. Unions
required to take 10% pay cut as condition of loan. A.W.,
Aug. 24, 1981, at 31.
10/5/81 Senate Commerce Committee drafts further C.A.B. sunset
legislation, which would require the C.A.B. to cease to ex-
ist by April 1, 1983. Thereafter mergers to be handled by
Department of Justice as with any other industry. A.W.,
Oct. 5, 1981, at 49.
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10/12/81 President Reagan gives final approval to TXI takeover of
control of Continental Airlines, Inc. TXI owns 50.3% of
stock for which it paid $96.6 million. B.W., Oct. 26, 1981,
at 182.
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